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Abstract 
In this paper, we address an empirical puzzle. We note that a deliberate and serious drive to 
internationalize has occurred rather late in the evolution of large Brazilian firms. Meanwhile, and 
despite their late internationalization, these Brazilian firms expanded rapidly and intently. 
Despite the rich literature on Emerging Market Multinational Enterprises (EMNEs), there is still 
much contention on what drives rapid EMNE internationalization, particularly for the less 
explored firms from Latin America. Using an inductive case study of five leading Brazilian 
MNEs, we bring new insights on this neglected question. We unveil that the existence of 
organizational slack (of operational, managerial, and financial nature) can indeed facilitate rapid 
internationalization, particularly when triggered by unique home country conditions (e.g., 
regulation; rising cost of doing business at home; exhaustion of profitable growth opportunities 
in the domestic market).  
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Organizational Slack as An Enabler of Internationalization:  
The Case of Large Brazilian Firms 
 
1. Introduction 
It is widely agreed that expanding business activity across national boundaries is one of the 
most important and complex strategic decisions encountered by managers (Johanson and Vahlne, 
1977; Tseng, Tansuhaj, Hallagan and McCullough, 2007). Reasons for internationalization are 
complex and include resource-, market- and efficiency-seeking motives (Dunning, 1988), as well 
as a desire to seek strategic assets, escape investment, trade-supportive investment, finance-
supportive investment, management-supportive investment and passive investment (Cuervo-
Cazurra, Narula and Un, 2015; Cuervo-Cazurra and Ramamurti, 2015; Dunning, 1993; Guillen 
and Garcia-Canal, 2009). While the study of internationalization motives has been conducted 
largely in the context of Advanced Market Multinational Enterprises (AMNEs), some recent 
research has turned the focus to Emerging Market Multinational Enterprises (EMNEs) (Gaffney, 
Kedia and Clampit, 2013; Guillen and Garcia-Canal, 2009; Kirca et al., 2012; Tseng, et al., 
2007), offering new insights and indication of the distinctiveness of the two types of 
multinationals (Tan and Peng, 2003). 
Nevertheless, studies on EMNEs have not only been rather dispersed, but they have been 
largely based on Chinese (i.e. Li, Strange, Ning and Sutherland, 2016; Bhaumik, Driffield and 
Zhou, 2016) and, to a lesser extent, Indian firms (Buckley, Forsans and Munjal, 2012; Ciravegna, 
Fitzgerald, and Kundu, 2013). Research on EMNEs from different institutional contexts can 
further advance our understanding of this increasingly important type of global enterprise. 
Understanding the dynamics of evolution within each emerging market, and identifying the 
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opportunities and challenges domestic markets are facing, we can fully comprehend the 
ouderlying drivers and conditions that facilitate EMNEs internationalization (Drummond, 2012).  
In this paper, we address an empirical puzzle. We note that a deliberate and serious drive to 
internationalize has occurred rather late in the evolution of large Brazilian firms. These firms 
have embarked on a major campaign to pursue international opportunities only in the past decade 
or so, while their counterparts in other emerging markets had begun their internationalization 
drives at least a decade earlier. Meanwhile, and despite their late internationalization, these 
Brazilian firms expanded rapidly and intently. In his context, Bell et al. (2003) wrote about  
“Born-again global firms”, firms that while operating for a number of years on a national base, 
due to a critical event, they changed the strategy and internationalized rapidly (Bell et al., 2003: 
351). Unfortunately, we know little about these firms, their drivers and triggers to 
internationalization (Kallinic & Forza, 2012). In the current study, we provide new insights on 
this neglected question, exploring what may have finally prompted but also facilitated large 
Brazilian firms to pursue late, but vigorous internationalization. 
We adopt an inductive case analysis of five leading Brazilian firms and contribute to the IB 
literature in two distinct ways. First, we inform the literature about distinct enablers to 
internationalization that have spurred these Born-again global Brazilian firms’. As argued by 
Brenes, Montoya, and Ciravegna (2014), Latin American MNEs are underrepresented in the 
extant literature, a fact which is rather unfortunate given their increasing presence in the global 
economy. Latin America provides an interesting and rather unique context for testing old 
theories and generating new insights on the internationalization of EMNEs (Aguilera, Ciravegna, 
Cuervo-Cazurra, and Gonzalez-Perez, 2015). In addition, Latin America is home to some of the 
most notable global players (Aguilera et al., 2015). Brazil is a particular case among Latin 
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American markets with 11 firms featured among the Boston Consulting Group’s (100) global 
challengers and two firms among BCG’s (19) graduates (BCG, 2016). To this end, we 
investigate five of the largest Brazilian firms that have embarked upon late, but intense, 
internationalization. All are leaders in their respective industries at home.  
Second, we unravel insights on the importance of specific organizational drivers that have 
motivated and facilitated those Brazilian firms’ late – but intense - internationalization. Using an 
inductive case approach, we seek an explanation based on insights from senior managers, and 
identify key determinants that led not only to the decision, but also the success of the endeavor. 
To this end, we reveal one common denominator, the role of organizational slack. We define 
organizational slack as excess firm resources and capabilities that can be deployed for new 
strategic objectives. While some limited research has also linked internationalization to 
organizational slack (Lin, Cheng, and Liu, 2009; Poynter and White, 1984; Tseng et al., 2007), 
there is scant evidence on the role of slack in the late internationalization of EMNEs. We find 
convincing evidence which suggests that the Brazilian firms studied here had accumulated 
substantial slack resources, triggering an accelerated pace of internationalization activities, only 
when certain facilitating conditions were also present in the home market. 
Finally, and in resolving this puzzle, we acknowledge the partial role of increasingly 
unfavorable home market conditions (e.g., increasing competition, shrinking domestic market 
shares, legal restrictions to growth in the domestic market, and rising cost of doing business at 
home), as the “critical incident” denoted by Bell et al. (2003) and Kalinic & Forza (2012). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first provide a brief review on the 
determinants of EMNE internationalization and identify the context-specific attributes of the 
Brazilian market. We then describe the methodological approach, as well as our data collection 
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efforts. We then report our findings and interpretations, and relate these to key theoretical 
foundations. 
 
2. Determinants of EMNEs Internationalization: The Brazilian Case 
Deciphering the puzzle of EM (emerging market) firms’ internationalization has never been an 
easy endeavor. Generally assumed to be lacking key strategic resources – e.g., technological, 
managerial and organizational means – resource, and strategic asset-seeking (Dunning, 1988, 
1993) have been frequently presumed to be driving their internationalization activities (Buckley, 
Munjal, Enderwick and Forsans 2016; Luo and Tung, 2007). As a result, EM firms would be 
assumed to be ‘pushed’ abroad either as a way to obtain external resources so they can more 
effectively overcome barriers of internationalization and liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995), 
or as a way of escaping increasingly less favorable conditions at home.  
Emerging markets are typically more volatile and tend to suffer higher variation in demand 
conditions. There may be times of reduction (or deceleration) in demand. As argued by Sing 
(1986), dissatisfaction with performance tends to induce higher risk taking; especially when 
continuation of past paths (e.g., competition in the domestic arena) “lead[s] to undesirable results 
due to changes in internal or external environments, top managers intentionally pursue path-
breaking strategies” (Kalasin, Dussauge, and Rivera-Santos, 2014: 76-77). Therefore, 
expectations of lower than desired prospects in the domestic market may prompt a firm to be 
pushed into taking up international forays as a way of escaping increasingly less favorable 
conditions at home (Guillen and Garcia-Canal, 2009).  
 While the recent expansion of Brazilian firms internationally has gained some limited 
attention in the literature (e.g., Aguilera et al, 2015; Fleury and Fleury, 2009; Williamson, 
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Ramamurti, Fleury and Fleury, 2013), the case of Brazil poses an interesting puzzle. For many 
years, the Brazilian firms shied away from international forays, perhaps lacking a global mindset 
(Da Rocha and Da Silva, 2009; Da Rocha, Da Silva and Carneiro, 2007). The turbulent political 
environment and certain macroeconomic deterrents (e.g., foreign exchange volatility, high 
interest rates, and lack of long-term financing sources), coupled with the deficient logistics 
infrastructure for exports, prevented most Brazilian firms from undertaking significant 
internationalization drives, and led them to pursue just a few sporadic export initiatives (Da 
Rocha, 2003). Furthermore, the possibility of expanding abroad via foreign direct investment 
was avoided as these firms are typically vertically integrated (as a consequence of lack of access 
to (foreign or domestic) suppliers in the past), which made it difficult to replicate their domestic 
market success abroad (Cyrino and Tanure, 2009). Finally, the isolation of Brazil – protectionist 
policies, geographical barriers (the Andes mountain range, the water lands (Pantanal) and the 
Amazon Forest), and cultural differences allowed these firms to seek growth opportunities at 
home (Da Rocha, 2003). 
 Remarkably, in the most recent decade, many established Brazilian firms have finally 
made significant ventures into international markets (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2015; Fleury and 
Fleury, 2009; Williamson et al., 2013). Key external circumstances transforming the Brazilian 
environment, stimulating as such internationalization, have already captured scholarly attention 
(Carneiro and Brenes, 2014). Such conditions include: economic, fiscal and institutional stability 
(after the Real Plan in 1994); the wave of globalization; saturation of the domestic market (for 
some sectors); economic liberalization and openness to foreign competitors on Brazilian ground; 
productive reconfiguration and enhanced competitiveness, and privatization. In addition, 
investments in professional and managerial education, establishment of the Mercosur trade bloc, 
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a new generation of managers (younger, with language skills, professional experience abroad and 
a global mindset), client following, network pressures, and the availability of long-term funding 
from BNDES (the national development bank) also made it possible for some firms to engage in 
international acquisitions. Carneiro and Brenes (2014) report further on the desire to diversify 
country risk, while Anand, Brenes, Karnani, and Rodriguez (2006) and Fleury and Fleury (2011) 
mention the need to develop competitive advantage as a way to address foreign competition. 
 While the above external factors certainly seem to have contributed to a more favorable 
environment for firm internationalization in Brazil, the question of why well-established 
Brazilian firms took so long to exploit foreign market opportunities in a serious manner remains 
an intriguing one. We contend that, while environmental variables paved the way for 
internationalization, becoming the “critical incident” behind their decision (Bell et al., 2003), 
internal circumstances had to be in place – before even these conditions arise – for a 
wholehearted engagement in internationalization. As Guillen and Garcia-Canal (2009: 25) 
succinctly claimed: “Multinational firms exist because certain economic conditions and 
proprietary advantages make it advisable and possible for them to profitably undertake 
production of a good or service in a foreign location.”  
 But what are these proprietary advantages, and how did they facilitate the late but 
accelerated internationalization of large Brazilian MNEs? These questions remain still largely 
unanswered. While more and more evidence come to light suggesting that EMNEs are not 
simply “pushed” into internationalization, but can also be “pulled” into it by their unique 
resources and capabilities [i.e., experience in addressing poor infrastructure, corruption, 
bureaucracy, and uncertainty, as argued by Buckley et al. (2012) or privileged access to 
resources and markets, economies of scale, as well as advantages of coping with adversity, as 
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argued by Bhaumik et al. (2016) and Ramamurti (2009)], few studies have offered satisfactory 
explanations for Brazilian firms. 
 
3. Data and Methods  
 
3.1. The Inductive Case Rationale 
Our aim in this paper is to extend existing theoretical explanations of the factors contributing to 
the late, but intense internationalization of large Brazilian MNEs. Since little empirical evidence 
exists on the topic, we apply an inductive multiple-case study approach. Such an approach can 
provide us with a better understanding of the unexplored dynamics of the phenomenon 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007, Yin, 1981), and a stronger base for theory building: “…the 
theory is better grounded, more accurate, and more generalizable (all else equal) when it is based 
on multiple case experiments” (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007: 27).  
 
3.2. The Sample 
We employ an inductive, multiple-case study approach and investigate five well-established 
Brazilian MNEs that showcased a similar trajectory in their late internationalization process (see 
Table 1a). This particular group of firms is interesting because, although they are characterized 
as relatively late entrants to international markets (Fleury and Fleury, 2009), several have now 
become global leaders (Carneiro and Brenes, 2014), with four of them featured in Boston 
Consulting Group’s (100) Global Challengers (BCG, 2016).  
*** insert Table 1a *** 
All selected companies are manufacturers, catering to a wide cross-section of the domestic 
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market. They have enjoyed for many years a very strong position in the domestic market. For 
example, at the time of data collection (2013-2014), BRF was the world's seventh largest food 
company, the largest poultry exporter and the second largest meat exporter in the world. JBS was 
the world's largest beef producer. Marcopolo was one of the largest manufacturers of bus bodies 
in the world. Tigre was the largest producer of pipes in South America and stood among the 
largest in the world. Metalfrio was the second largest manufacturer of commercial refrigerators. 
The similarity across these five cases (in terms of the same country origin and leadership in the 
home market) allows for a literal replication strategy (Yin, 2013) and avoids confounding of 
other characteristics of firms and environments that might also influence internationalization 
patterns. Yet, this relative homogeneity across the cases does not allow for immediate 
generalization to other contexts (e.g., other countries or other types of firms).  
Through our data collection efforts, we wished to gain an appreciation of facts that could be 
provided only by well-informed insiders. Accordingly, we interviewed executives occupying key 
positions in their firms, ensuring that they were knowledgeable about the history and the 
characteristics of their organizations and their internationalization paths. 
*** insert Table 1b *** 
 
3.3. Data Collection and Analysis 
Initially, we examined a comprehensive set of archival data and reports, along with data 
from secondary sources. We gathered data and insights from articles and notes published in the 
business press, especially through an electronic search of business newspaper Valor Econômico 
and the business magazine Exame. In particular, we searched for material on the 
internationalization of the firms, also combing the pages of websites maintained by the firms. 
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This initial data gathering stage was imperative so as to set the background of the investigated 
firms, and clarify their position in their perspective markets, particularly during their 
international expansion endeavors. Furthermore, such material provided corroboration of the 
intense international expansion. However, the explanations (beyond the mere descriptive data 
that is usually published in the business press) that supported such expansion came only from the 
primary data.  
As a second step, we carried out face-to-face, open-script, interviews with senior executives 
in the selected firms. While we interviewed just a single executive per company, we chose very 
knowledgeable executives (either directors or CEOs), who either had been in the company at the 
beginning of the period of intense internationalization or else occupied a top-level position that 
allowed them to understand the company’s history, competences and challenges.  
Since ex-post facto rationalization is always a threat when retrospective data is collected, we 
did not direct questions that might allow the interviewees to infer our logic (and maybe adjust 
their responses accordingly). In fact, we never asked about (slack) resources, but rather inquired 
freely about their reasons for internationalization versus expansion in the domestic market, risks 
and challenges of international operations and how they were addressed, as well as about the 
choice of entry modes and their learnings from their internationalization ventures. 
The interview script was quite flexible, as we allowed the executives to talk freely over 
those general issues. From their responses and triangulation with secondary data, we inferred the 
impact of slack resources and changes in the domestic market conditions as the combination of 
drivers that spurred intense internationalization.  
4. The Interview Findings  
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Two principal themes emerged from the in-depth interviews: (a) resources possessed by these 
firms at the time of internationalization; and (b) conditions under which these companies were 
pushed into internationalization. 
4.1 Resource Prowess prior to Internationalization  
Respondents emphasized their firms’ resource prowess prior to the surge of internationalization, 
particularly on their innovative prowess, product quality, operational expertise and service 
excellence in their respective industries. Clearly, these firms did not need to go abroad in search 
of strategic assets – they had developed them from their home country operations. 
To give an example, BRF had already achieved high economies of scale at the plant level 
and the country level, positioning the firm well above competition in terms of exports. It 
produced high quality products (chicken and pork), possessed production and distribution 
excellence, as well as innovation proficiency – all capabilities promptly deployable in the new 
markets1. JBS executives noted that originating from a large domestic market gives the firm 
some scale advantage: ‘It starts from a high V0. […] Scale is fundamental.’ Similarly, Tigre, with 
a track record of around 700 new products every year, and fifteen percent of its turnover 
generated by its newly launched products, was also well-known among the construction firms for 
the quality and innovative properties of its products. In fact, according to research from 
Interbrand, its estimated brand asset value corresponded to around 40 percent of the value of the 
company. 
Furthermore, being established as early as the 1940s (Tigre in 1941 and BRF in 1949), these 
companies presented a very rich history and management proficiency. Their executives 
                                               
1  … effectively deployed through a “Global Sourcing and Intelligence System in procurement for monitoring risks 
and opportunities in the most important production chains”, as reported in Company reports on the synergies 
developed from the increasing international activities. 
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highlighted their managerial and leadership ranks, strengthened by new talent, while retaining 
members of the initial founding teams on their board of directors. Some respondents talked at 
length about their company’s rich expertise in domestic mergers and acquisitions prior to 
internationalization. This experience provided them with a unique experience into the integration 
hurdles and allowed them to better foresee the challenges of similar activities in foreign markets.  
For example, BRF was the successful result of the merger of the two largest Brazilian firms 
in the poultry industry. When the firm decided to speed up internationalization, the company 
chose FDI whenever exports were not feasible: ‘[...] it is cheaper to produce chicken in Brazil 
and export to the Middle East than to produce there… yet, some large markets are not always 
accessible through exports. In that case, we pursue FDI via acquisitions or even greenfield 
investment,’ said a BRF executive. Similarly, JBS had grown in Brazil by means of acquisitions, 
developing a rich expertise. JBS’s Director confided that the firm found it easier to identify 
cheap targets for acquisition than to grow organically.  
Importantly, these executives all noted the excess liquidity and access to financial resources 
(through capital markets or other funding institutions) that were available to them prior to 
internationalization. Being large players in their respective markets, and having achieved high 
efficiency of scale and scope, these companies enjoyed high market shares and favorable profit 
margins. To provide an example, JBS, having the support of BNDES (Brazilian Development 
Bank), which poured a huge amount of money into the company -- both in loans and in equity 
capital, through a (never officially stated) “national champions” program -- never felt financially 
constrained. Hence, it could exploit in foreign markets its expertise on acquiring firms. It sought 
firms in financial distress, but with good operations and brands, such that the company could pay 
a lower price for them and achieve high turnaround profitably.  
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BRF received a smaller, though still substantial, financial support of BNDES in the form of 
loans and capital contribution, which helped offset part of the loss that Sadia (merging with 
Perdigão to form BRF) had incurred into from a disastrous financial derivatives operation in the 
past. Interestingly, even the executives of those firms that were not part of the (unofficial) 
“national champions” program, such as Marcopolo, Tigre and Metalfrio, commented on their 
ability to accumulate financial resources from their own operations to fund their international 
expansion drives. 
 
4.2 Motives to internationalize 
While the studied firms had accumulated valuable resources and capabilities, the domestic 
market was deemed either saturated or simply too costly for further exploitation and 
capitalization, conditions that led them to consider internationalization as an important growth 
avenue. It is therefore not surprising that these Brazilian firms seemed to have adopted a market-
seeking strategy when first internationalizing, rather than a resource- or strategic asset-seeking 
strategy. When the executives were asked about their motivations to internationalize in the first 
place, many indicated their desire to expand sales via internationalization. Efficiency-seeking 
drivers were also noted, but these were only secondary to market-seeking objectives.  
Executives interviewed reported as their major driver for internationalization the 
preservation of growth rates and profitability margins via market development strategy. For 
example, JBS working at (plant wide) maximum efficient scale and enjoying scale economies 
before internationalizing, had identified a ceiling in the volume of products sold in the domestic 
market. Hence any further growth could only have come from internationalization. Accessing 
cheaper funding and exploiting arbitrage benefits (differences in product prices across markets) 
14 
 
were further motives for JBS to internationalize.  
BRF, prior to internationalization, had faced severe regulatory restrictions in terms of 
further acquisitions in Brazil, imposed by CADE (equivalent to the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission). Hence, as stated by a senior executive: ‘[…] the trend to go abroad was only 
natural. Although there were no impediments to growing organically in the domestic market or 
to innovate, this growth […] would eventually reach a limit.’  
Similarly, Marcopolo, despite enjoying a strong position in the Brazilian market, with more 
than 40 percent of market share, faced fierce competition, which could easily cut into its profit 
margins. Thus, internationalization enabled the firm to step away from domestic competition 
and, at the same time, practice global sourcing, to achieve lower production costs. Selling abroad 
presented lower costs and increased overall profit margins, given less intense competition in 
some countries. 
In addition, some of these firms (e.g., BRF and Tigre) had already reached virtual 
saturation in their main premium market segments, so that further volume growth at home could 
only be achieved by serving lower quality, lower price, markets – which was contrary to their 
strategic positioning – or else via long-term wait for the natural advent of new well-off buyers. 
Finally, BRF, JBS, and Metalfrio executives stated that internationalization of the firm was 
also heavily motivated by the stifling regulatory constraints at home which restricted the 
company’s expansion domestically. Given the regulatory restrictions to their growth through 
further acquisitions in Brazil, these firms saw the external market as a natural way to keep 
growing.  
It is noteworthy to add that although seeking resources or strategic assets abroad was not 
the primary reason to internationalization for any of the firms (contrary to what has been argued 
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in the literature, e.g., Guillen and Garcia-Canal, 2010; Luo and Tung, 2007; Yamakawa, Peng, 
and Deeds, 2008) – although each eventually acquired some strategic assets abroad. For 
example, BRF contends that they have learned about unconventional commercial practices in the 
Middle East – with respect to selling to low-income consumers and small businesses -- which 
can be applied to other emerging markets as well, including Brazil. Tigre and JBS executives 
maintain that their U.S. operations have been very important for learning purposes. Also, since 
the firms have grown through acquisitions abroad, they have been exposed to latest ideas and 
best practices, applicable to different operations in multiple countries. Marcopolo admitted 
gaining invaluable technical know-how and expertise from its international experience. This was 
also the reason why it invested in Portugal (necessitating strict quality demands from suppliers 
and buyers). Metalfrio further argued that purchasing a well-known brand abroad can help the 
firm boost its sales in the domestic market and globally. “By consolidating all acquired brands 
under Metalfrio brand is a way to start putting my little brand everywhere in the world,” noted 
the company’s Director. 
 
5. Discussion  
 
5.1. Drivers of Late Internationalization by Large Brazilian Firms 
Our interviews and secondary information led a to key conclusion: these firms did not 
necessarily go international in search of resources and capabilities, an argument that has been 
referred to as the ‘springboard theory’ of internationalization (Luo and Tung, 2007). Nor did they 
seem to base their international success solely on exploiting home country comparative 
advantages, contrary to other findings (e.g. Rugman, 2009). Rather, already enjoying a strong 
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domestic position –derived from firm-specific advantages – these firms had accumulated an 
abundance of resources and capabilities, which would have gone underutilized in the domestic 
market. While the lack of further growth possibilities in the domestic market acted as a 
motivator, the presence of ample, but untapped resources and capabilities, gave these firms a 
realistic start in their intense international forays. As Ramamurti (2012: 45) noted: “[t]he notion 
that firms must have ownership advantages before they can engage in market-seeking 
internationalization seems to hold up well even for EMNEs”. Development of competitive 
advantages prior to moving abroad has also been reported for firms from other emerging markets 
(Brenes et al., 2014). 
 Our research made it evident that two conditions paved the way to late but aggressive 
internationalization on the part of these  firms. Domestic market leadership allowed these firms 
to accumulate a critical mass of available excess resources. Thus, we argue that the presence of 
organizational slack, acquired prior to internationalization, and at the same time, limits to 
domestic growth opportunities, tended to push these firms to cultivate foreign market 
opportunities more intently. 
We further argue that three specific categories of organizational slack were predominantly 
recognized as contributors to accelerated internationalization of the firms studied: operational, 
managerial, and financial slack. We now elaborate on these. 
Operational slack refers to available intangible firm-specific resources such as: (a) cost-
efficiencies due to economies of scale and scope; (b) customized product design skills; (c) R&D 
excellence (especially in product quality and innovation); (d) technical service (maintenance) 
skills; (e) recognized corporate brand; (f) branding (especially, in the domestic market) and 
marketing expertise; and (g) experience in distribution (especially, in the domestic market). 
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These resources can be deployed without jeopardizing their use in their current applications 
(Sharfman et al., 1988; Singh, 1986). Studies have shown that knowledge-based resources 
(technological prowess, distinctive operational processes and innovations) positively affect 
multinationality (Tseng et al., 2007).  
Managerial slack refers to administrative and control prowess, experience, and business 
expertise of the management team that can be easily deployed in new markets. As an example, 
evidence of prior experience in mergers and acquisitions would enable companies to utilize FDI 
as a mode of entry in prospective markets.  
Financial slack is identified as the profitability and excess liquidity of the firm. Excess 
financial resources and the ability of a firm to raise funds have been reported to influence 
international activity (Tseng et al., 2007; Buckley et al., 2016). In our interviews, executives 
commented both on the level of financial availability but also on the case of funding at the time 
of internationalization.  
In Table 2, we provide specific evidence for the existence of these three types of 
organizational slack in each of the firms. In the discussion that follows, we provide a fuller 
elaboration of how organizational slack appears to have paved the way for the 
internationalization of these firms under the changing home market conditions.  
*** insert Table 2 about here *** 
 
5.2. The Role of Organizational Slack in Internationalization 
Conceptually, organizational slack refers to the ‘cushion of actual or potential resources which 
allow an organization to adapt successfully to internal pressures for adjustment or to external 
pressures for change in policy, as well as to initiate changes in strategy with respect to the 
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external environment’ (Bourgeois, 1981: 30). From an organizational perspective, slack can be 
very beneficial to the organization. First, acting as a defense mechanism–a buffer–against 
turbulent times (Cyert and March, 1963), slack offers the organization the necessary flexibility to 
quickly respond and adapt to changes in its environment (Bourgeois, 1981; Poynter and White, 
1977). Second, slack can offer the necessary maneuvering room for firms to engage in 
experimental projects (whose payoffs are difficult to predict) and pursue opportunities in the 
domestic or international market that they would normally avoid in resource-constrained 
environments (Dolmans, van Burg, Reymen, and Romme, 2014; Nohria and Gulati, 1996). 
Third, slack can act as a buffer mechanism against intra-organizational problems, by allowing 
diverse goals to be simultaneously pursued within the organization, consequently reducing 
internal political activity and intra-departmental conflict (Bourgeois, 1981).  
It is, therefore, not surprising that scholars have already proposed that deployment of excess 
organizational resources are conducive in implementing new strategies. Such resources can 
provide the firm with the necessary platform to overcome the barriers and costs of expanding in a 
foreign market (Lin, Cheng, and Liu, 2009; Poynter and White, 1984; Tseng et al., 2007). The 
presence of slack is a critical source of managerial discretion (Cyert and March, 1963) in 
overcoming the uncertainties deriving from “liability of foreignness” (Zaheer, 1995), while 
offering the necessary room for rapid growth in a new market (Tan, 2009), both crucial 
conditions to successful internationalization.  
To successfully survive and grow in a foreign market, a firm should grow rapidly to “reach a 
size at which its operations are cost-competitive with incumbent firms” (Tan, 2009: 1046). The 
presence of excess resources is almost a prerequisite for success. Excess resources can help firms 
grow through experimentation (Bourgeois, 1981; Lin et al., 2009; Nohria and Gulati, 1996) and 
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the exploitation of new opportunities in the international markets (George, 2005; Voss, 
Sirdeshmukh, and Voss, 2008), with the minimum disturbance on the operations of the parent 
company (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999). Such abundance of resources allows the latecomers in 
global markets, such as the Brazilian firms studied, to effectively overcome the liability and 
competitive disadvantage they have against their established counterparts, by being more flexible 
and innovative, and promptly responding to the requirements of globalization (Guillen and 
Garcia-Canal, 2009). 
The availability of slack resources in an emerging market context may be even more 
instrumental for internationalization. Internationalization requires both high initial capital and 
subsequent abundance of resources to overcome the barriers and risks stemming from liability of 
foreignness and late entry. Yet, in emerging markets, resource accessibility is rare. Product factor 
markets are inefficient and are not equally accessible to all actors (Ghemawat and Khanna, 
1998), discouraging firms from any resource-intensive activities such as international expansion. 
The presence of information asymmetries (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; 2006) heightens the risks 
of internationalization even more. After all, internationalization is based on reliable knowledge 
of the foreign market conditions, trade restrictions, and overseas competition, so that the 
company can choose where to expand, and properly adapt to the requirements of the foreign 
environment (Liesch and Knight, 1999, Buckley et al., 2012). Furthermore, restrictions in 
accessing external funding (Khanna and Palepu, 2000) impose an extra barrier to 
internationalization activities. In emerging countries, private domestic firms have often been 
deterred from accessing external funding bodies. For example, in China, although state-owned 
enterprises’ expansive plans were for many years highly supported, similar opportunities were 
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not offered to private ventures, which were denied both state funding and access to China’s stock 
exchange market (Yamakawa et al., 2008).  
 Past research has placed great emphasis on the role of resources in ensuring the 
successful engagement within new markets (Tseng et al., 2007). While, firm-specific resources 
have been presumed as a necessary condition for (successful) internationalization (Hymer, 1960; 
Dunning, 1988), the literature has provided scant evidence of the role of slack resources in 
emerging markets as a driver of internationalization. Our findings corroborate and provide 
further support for the key role of slack resources for rapid internationalization, particularly for 
late internationalizers from emerging markets. 
 
5.3. The Triggering Role of Unfavorable Conditions in the Home Market  
Our research suggests that slack resources are a vital element for internationalization, especially 
when intense internationalization is sought. Nevertheless, they became instrumental when the 
prospects for profitable further domestic growth were curtailed. In fact, it was unfavorable home-
market conditions that became the “critical incidence” (Bell et al., 2003; Kalinic & Forza, 2012) 
triggering the use of the slack resources for intense international forays. 
Based on above evidence and discussion, we can advance a formal proposition as follows:  
  Intense, though late, international expansion of large Brazilian firms can be attributed 
to:(i) the possession of previously accumulated organizational slack -–operational, 
managerial and/or financial; and (ii) motivating conditions (e.g., increasing 
competition at home, shrinking domestic market shares, legal restrictions to growth in 
the domestic market, and rising cost of doing business at home.) 
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6. Conclusion 
In this study, we employed an inductive case study approach to resolve the puzzle of what 
made it possible for five leading Brazilian firms to engage in late but aggressive 
internationalization. The analysis reveals that in all five cases, the common denominator was the 
presence of slack firm-specific resources and capabilities. These successful Brazilian firms all 
possessed, and successfully deployed, some combination of operational, managerial and/or 
financial slack.  
With respect to operational slack, the five Brazilian firms exhibited a unique blend of 
tangible and intangible resources, such as technological innovations, product quality, operational 
efficiency, marketing and distribution expertise, operational excellence, and branding 
capabilities, which could easily be redeployed in the international markets of their expansive 
plans. With regards to managerial slack, almost all firms exhibited rich firm-specific and 
industrial experience and particularly substantial experience in mergers and acquisitions. Finally, 
with respect to financial slack, these firms presented clear financial liquidity from prior 
operational capacity and/or easy access to external funding. 
Our study suggested that changes in some domestic market conditions external to the 
firms, which made it less feasible to grow profitably at home, served as a motive for 
internationalization. However, it was clearly the existence of slack resources that made it 
possible to implement aggressive international drives. Thus, it was the combination of 
unfavorable home country conditions with the presence of organizational slack that prompted the 
concentrated international expansion of the firms investigated here. Our findings are in line with 
the premise that in emerging markets, organizational slack is more likely to be a facilitator for 
firm expansion beyond national borders.  
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As with all studies, the current one does not come without any shortcomings. Main 
limitation of the study is its small sample of companies the insights are based upon. Although the 
purpose of the study concentrated on offering first insights on the factors that motivated and 
triggered late internationalization of Emerging Market leaders, the fact that we based our 
findings on five cases alone limits the generalizability of our proposition. To assess the 
generalizability, it is necessary to test the results through different research designs, such as a 
comprehensive survey. Furthermore, and given the diversity in institutional environments and 
the characteristics of firms across different EMs, the findings reported here need to be validated 
in other country settings. Even within the Latin American context, the behavior of Multilatinas 
may differ from one to another.  
Another limitation of the study resonates from the limited number of interviewees that 
participated in the study. Although this choice was purposeful so we can understand the motives 
of the decision makers at the time, we acknowledge that further insights can be drawn by 
analyzing the opinions of other members of the executive team as well. Unfortunately, this was 
not accomplished. Similarly, another limitation is the retrospective trait of the study. Time 
perspective and lack of memory always make the retrospective research design problematic. A 
more extensive longitudinal study could resolve these issue, offering further validation of our 
initial insights.  
Finally, we acknowledge that the scope of our study remains somewhat limited to the 
factors and triggers of internationalization. Yet we further need to better understand how the 
institutional differences in Latin America may bear an impact on general internationalization 
patterns of the Multilatinas. In particular, future research should focus on differences of Where to 
(which countries), What (activities internationalized), Who (role of decision-makers) and How 
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much (performance effects), derived from being originated from Latin America (or other 
emerging markets for that matter). Another worthwhile theme is whether state ownership has a 
distinct impact on the internationalization patterns of the Multilatinas. Also, family firms, non-
listed companies and firms related to business groups – quite pervasive in many other EMs – 
may have distinct internationalization profiles regarding motivations, ownership advantages, 
country selection and entry modes. 
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Table 1a: Background on firms studied 
 
BRF. A producer of processed meat (mainly poultry and pork, but also beef), that also competes in milk, 
margarine, pasta, pizzas and frozen vegetables businesses. BRF is the result of a merger, in 2009, of the 
two largest Brazilian firms in the poultry business (Sadia and Perdigão). One of these firms (Sadia) was 
established in 1949 and the other (Perdigão) in 1934.  
 
Internationalization History: Sadia initiated exports in 1975. At the time of data collection (2013), 41 
percent of the Company’s revenues was generated in international markets; of which 32 percent in 
Middle East, 22.5 percent in the Far East, 17.5 percent in Europe, 10 percent in Eurasia and the rest in 
all other countries. The company established joint ventures in technology in 1989 (Japan) and in 
production in 1990 (Portugal); it had processing facilities in Abu Dhabi, Argentina, the Netherlands, and 
UK; and commercial offices in Dubai, Japan, Singapore and UK. Perdigão adopted further FDI activities 
in the 70’s, reaching Japan in 1985 and Europe in 1990; it operated one distribution center in Europe and 
had commercial offices in several countries: Austria, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, UK, and United Arab Emirates 
 
JBS. Founded in 1953, JBS is a producer of processed meat (mainly beef and poultry) that also competes 
in leather, products for pets, biodiesel, collagen, and cleaning products.  
 
Internationalization History: The company initiated exports to Europe in 1996. Along the 2000’s, it 
acquired several production facilities globally. By 2011, JBS had 140 production facilities across the 
globe, including major operations in the U.S, China, Mexico, Russia, Paraguay, and Uruguay, while it 
adopted further FDI activities in Africa, Mexico, and the Middle East. The majority of revenues came 
mainly from the U.S. and Australia (73%) as well as South America (24%). 
 
Marcopolo. One of the most recognized bus body manufacturers, the company was founded in 1949. 
Their products are particularly well adapted to the harsh conditions of Brazilian (and other emerging 
market) roads. The company had developed strong ties with well-known manufacturers.  
 
Internationalization History: Marcopolo started exports (to Uruguay) as early as 1961. The company 
established wholly-owned production facilities in Portugal, Argentina, Mexico, South Africa; 
partnerships in production in China, India, Russia, Egypt and Canada; commercial offices in China; 
licensing agreements with China since 1999; and a training center in South Africa 
At the time of data collection (2013), the company generated 21 percent of its revenues from the 
international markets; of which 40% in Australia, 39% in Mexico and 13% in Africa. 
 
Tigre. A manufacturer of pipes and fittings in PVC (polyvinyl chloride), brushes, PVC window frames, 
and water tanks. It was established in 1941 with the acquisition of an ox horn combs plant and in 1950 
it started manufacturing pipes for plumbing. 
 
Internationalization History: The company initiated its international expansion in 1977 with a 
greenfield plant in Paraguay in association with local businessmen. As of mid-2014, the firm had 16 
plants (mostly wholly-owned) in nine countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Paraguay, Peru, U.S., and Uruguay), besides 12 plants in Brazil–and is the leading manufacturer of pipes 
in Latin America. Its international area is now run from Chile, but the headquarters remains in Brazil. 
 
Metalfrio. A manufacturer of commercial refrigerators (for beverages, ice creams, and frozen foods). 
Founded in Brazil in 1960, it was acquired in 1992 by a German firm, which sold Metalfrio to a Brazilian 
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investment fund in 2004.  
 
Internationalization History: Metalfrio undertook its first FDI in 2005 with a greenfield plant in 
Turkey. At present, the firm operates plants in Brazil, Mexico, Russia and Turkey and a distribution 
center in the U.S. and another in Mexico. Its international sales (in over 80 countries) are about 40 
percent of total sales (as of 2013, exports from Brazil represented only around 5 percent of domestic 
production and plants abroad exported around 20 percent of their production; most plants produce for 
their local markets. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1b: Timeline of some indicative internationalization activities 
 
Internationalization 
Timeline 
(new plants & 
commercial offices) 
1930-1960 1960-1980 1980-2000 2000-2010 2010+ 
BRF Brazil Saudi Arabia S. America S. America Middle East 
   U.S. Japan UAE China 
     Abu Dhabi Singapore 
     Argentina Europe 
       Europe   
JBS Brazil  Brazil  Brazil  Argentina Belgium 
     U.S. Australia 
     Australia China 
        Europe Russia 
Tigre Brazil  Paraguay Argentina Ecuador Peru 
    Chile U.S.   
    Bolivia Peru   
     Paraguay   
     Uruguay   
     Columbia   
        Ecuador   
Marcopolo Brazil  Uruguay Argentina S. Africa Australia 
   Venezuela Mexico China Canada 
   Japan  India  
     Egypt  
     Russia  
        Portugal   
Metalfrio Brazil  Brazil  Brazil Europe Turkey 
     Latin America   
     Russia   
     Mexico   
     U.S.   
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        Turkey   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Evidence for the deployment of organizational slack 
 
Firm Instances of organizational slack 
found 
How slack was deployed 
BRF 
 
Operational 
• Marketing capabilities (branding) 
• Brands (in foreign markets) 
• Marketing capabilities (distribution) 
• Scale efficiency and production 
capacity 
• R&D (product quality and product 
innovation) 
Managerial 
• Knowledge of unconventional 
commercial practices, applicable to 
emerging markets 
• Experience in mergers and 
acquisitions 
• The firm’s experience in branding helped it 
leverage the brands acquired abroad. 
• High export volumes, coupled with expertise 
in distribution, help the firm operate 
efficiently new warehousing facilities abroad. 
• Low operational costs (due to scale and scope 
economies) allowed the firm to take bolder 
initiatives. 
• Investments in R&D allow the company to 
cater to demanding markets abroad. 
• Knowledge of commercial practices tailored 
to particular characteristics of emerging 
markets can help the firm stand out from 
competitors. 
JBS 
 
Operational 
• Scale efficiency and production 
capacity 
• Financial cushion in operations 
• Marketing capabilities (distribution) 
• Opportunity for scale-efficient 
investment in warehousing and 
distribution  
Managerial 
• Experience in acquisitions 
• Low operational costs (due to scale and scope 
economies) allowed the firm to take bolder 
initiatives. 
• Production and distribution expertise helped 
keep up the operations of the firms it acquired 
abroad.  
• Integration of local production and exports, 
coupled with brands acquired abroad, 
enhanced the efficiency of warehousing, 
distribution and marketing activities. 
Marcopolo Operational 
• Recognized corporate brand 
domestically 
• R&D (product quality and product 
innovation) 
• Technical service (maintenance) 
skills  
• Scale efficiency and production 
capacity 
• Excellence in technical services reinforces the 
preference for its (better suited) products. 
• Low operational costs (due to scale 
economies) allowed the firm to take bolder 
initiatives. 
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Firm Instances of organizational slack 
found 
How slack was deployed 
Tigre 
 
Operational 
• Scale efficiency and production 
capacity 
• Recognized corporate brand 
domestically 
• Marketing capabilities (branding) 
• Marketing capabilities (distribution) 
• R&D (product quality & innovation) 
• Low operational costs (due to scale and scope 
economies) allowed the firm to take bolder 
initiatives. 
• The quality of its products, reinforced by the 
firm’s branding and distribution expertise, 
help the firm stand out from competition 
abroad.  
Metalfrio Operational 
• Foreign networks of (key account) 
clients 
• Marketing capabilities (branding) 
• Marketing capabilities (distribution) 
• R&D (product quality and product 
innovation) 
• Technical service (maintenance) 
skills 
• Recognized corporate brand and 
global corporate reputation  
• Well-known brands 
• Relationship with key players in the beverage 
business (e.g., Coca-Cola) helped the firm 
serve them in foreign markets. 
• Excellence in operations has allowed 
Metalfrio to acquire a poorly managed firm 
with good brands abroad.  
• Access to markets and clients, coupled with 
brands recognition and with product quality 
and innovation, opens up a fertile land for 
expansion. 
• Low operational costs (due to scale 
economies), coupled with easy access to 
financial resources 
 
Source:  Data drawn from personal interviews as well as the analysis of archival reports, online information, and 
other secondary sources
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